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Abstract 24	
Failure to understand the potential responses of fishers to management measures creates a 25	
significant risk of revisiting the familiar scenario of perverse and unintended consequences of 26	
those measures. This paper reports on a Choice Experiment survey to evaluate fisher’s 27	
preferences for various management measures proposed under the EU Common Fisheries 28	
Policy (CFP) reform process, but the conclusions have wider relevance as similar measures 29	
are used by comparable fleets in fisheries globally.  The survey was conducted with fishers 30	
involved in mixed pelagic and demersal fisheries in Ireland, pelagic fisheries in Denmark and 31	
demersal fisheries in Greece. Fisheries management policies were characterised by five 32	
attributes designed both to cover the principal CFP reform proposals and to integrate 33	
ecological, social, economic and institutional factors affecting fisher’s decisions.  The paper 34	
uses a random utility modelling framework to reveal the preferences of the fishers across the 35	
alternative policy attributes. Results show that while there are generally preferences both for 36	
healthy stocks and for maintaining the importance of fishing to the local community, strong 37	
inter-fishery preference differences exist. These differences are most notable in relation to a 38	
discard ban and to the use of individual transferable fishing rights, favoured in Denmark, but 39	
not in Ireland for instance.  The strength of these inter-fishery differences supports the 40	
assertion that there are no panaceas in fisheries management and that solutions should be 41	
tailored within the context of specific fisheries. Not doing so could create a significant risk of 42	
inappropriately managed fisheries that may lead to unsustainable outcomes.  43	
 44	
 45	
Keywords: Behaviour of fishers, Choice Experiment, Common Fisheries Policy, fisheries 46	
governance, Random Utility Model. 47	
 48	
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Introduction 64	
Successful governance of marine fisheries remains a difficult issue of global importance (FAO 65	
2016). The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (European Parliament and Council 66	
2013) is a case in point (Villasante et al. 2011). The CFP contains a wide range of management 67	
measures intended to solve the overarching problems identified during the CFP reform 68	
process (European Commission 2009). These measures include inter alia changes to 69	
governance arrangements such as regionalisation, economic instruments such as the 70	
proposed mandatory use of transferable quotas and conservation measures such as a landing 71	
obligation for quota species. Fisher’s relative preferences for these management measures, 72	
including those that may be positively received and could incentivise “good” behaviour, 73	
have not been systematically assessed. If we are to avoid the familiar problem, well known to 74	
those involved in fisheries management, of perverse and unintended consequences (Abbott 75	
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and Haynie 2012; Degnbol and McCay 2007) then it is necessary to have a greater 76	
understanding of fisher’s likely responses to these measures, following approaches taken in 77	
countries such as Australia (Fulton et al. 2011; Pascoe et al. 2009).  78	
The central question addressed by this paper is which management measures, and at what 79	
scale, create the right incentives to tackle the main failings of fisheries management, as 80	
exhibited under the CFP.  We report on an innovative approach to assessing fisher’s 81	
preferences for management measures and additionally to providing insight into how fishers 82	
are prepared to trade-off between them.  Choice Experiments (CE) are designed to measure 83	
the overall value of a good such as a healthy marine ecosystem while also discerning the 84	
marginal value or utility of that good’s individual attributes (Hanley et al. 1998; Hynes et al. 85	
2008). The importance of this is that management measures targeting those attributes most 86	
valued by stakeholders and which in theory will most incentivise change can be identified 87	
(Eliasen et al. 2014). 88	
The CE method has been widely used in environmental and agricultural economics (Hanley 89	
et al. 1998; Birol and Cox 2007; Hynes and Campbell 2011; Chhun et al. 2013) but has seldom 90	
been applied in relation to fisher’s preferences for different commercial fisheries management 91	
approaches. Oh et al. (2005) analysed preferences for various management options in 92	
recreational fisheries using a CE.  Duffield et al. (2012) modelled the behaviour of recreational 93	
Marlin anglers in the Western Pacific. Eggert and Martinnson (2003) used CE to explore levels 94	
of risk tolerance in commercial fishers. Groeneveld (2011) modelled preferences in the 95	
Netherlands with regards to a specific management measure, an area closed to fishing to 96	
protect juvenile Plaice.  There has also been some application of the CE approach to specific 97	
aspects of small-scale commercial fisheries in the developing world: Launio et al. (2009) 98	
examined the factors considered important for fishers in relation to Marine Protected Areas in 99	
the Philippines; while Kanchanaroek et al. (2013) modelled fisher’s property rights choices in 100	
a Cambodian small scale fishery. To the best of our knowledge there has been no previous 101	
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application of the CE method to model the preferences of fishers between alternative 102	
management measures in any commercial fisheries despite the fact that the method is well 103	
suited to making such an analysis.  This research is also the first to use the CE methodology 104	
to compare preference structures across a number of different fisheries. 105	
 106	
Case study fisheries 107	
Three case study fisheries were selected in which to conduct the Choice Experiment: the 108	
Celtic Sea herring (Clupea harengus, Clupeidae) fishery in Ireland; the Danish pelagic fishery 109	
and the Aegean demersal trawl fishery in Greece.  These fisheries were selected on the basis 110	
that they included one strictly pelagic, one strictly demersal and one mixed fishery which 111	
allows an examination of whether management preferences differ across types of European 112	
fishery. Figure 1 shows the grounds fished by each of the surveyed fleets. 113	
 114	
The Celtic Sea herring fishery 115	
The Celtic Sea herring fishery is conducted off the south coast of Ireland predominantly 116	
within 20 nautical miles of the coast. The fleet is highly diverse with vessels ranging from 117	
under 10m multi-purpose inshore vessels up to modern 45m refrigerated sea water (RSW) 118	
vessels.  Most of the participating vessels are classed as polyvalent, i.e. they alternate between 119	
pelagic and demersal fisheries during the year.  The fishery has traditionally been a very 120	
important one for both the fleet and processing sectors in the south of Ireland.  121	
The history of the fishery over the past 50 years has been one of an alternating boom and bust 122	
cycle. Following very low stock levels from approximately 1995 to 2007 the Spawning Stock 123	
Biomass (SSB) is currently at its highest point since the 1960’s while fishing mortality (F) rates 124	
are at their lowest recorded level. A long-term management plan (LTMP), jointly developed 125	
by the local management committee and scientists in 2011 has been evaluated by ICES as 126	
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being consistent with their precautionary and Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) approaches 127	
(Marine Institute 2013).  128	
A total of 86% of the Total Allowable Catch is allocated to Ireland and the only other 129	
significant players involved in the fishery are Dutch vessels and Dutch owned vessels from 130	
France and Germany.  It is essentially a single species fishery without any significant bycatch 131	
issues (Fitzpatrick 2013).  Prior to 2012 the fishery was effectively an open access one for 132	
vessels under approximately 20m in length while a pool of larger vessels retained access 133	
rights. Numbers of participating vessels increased steadily between 2007 and 2012 in both the 134	
main (offshore) and sentinel (inshore) fleet sectors (Le Floc’h et al. 2014). In 2012 a restricted 135	
access scheme was introduced by the Irish Fisheries Minister intended to reduce the number 136	
of vessels entitled to participate in the fishery (DAFF 2012).  137	
 138	
The Danish pelagic fishery  139	
The majority of Danish pelagic catches for human consumption are taken in the Northeast 140	
Atlantic, where the fleet mainly targets herring and mackerel (Scomber scombrus, Scombridae) 141	
in the North Sea (ICES area IVa and IVb) and herring in the Norwegian Sea (ICES area IIa). 142	
The main fleet consists of approximately ten vessels above 40m using pelagic trawls and 143	
purse seines (mainly for mackerel), while a similar sized fleet of smaller trawlers (mostly 144	
vessels less than 18m) fish herring in the inshore areas in the Kattegat (ICES area IIIa) and the 145	
Baltic Sea (IIIc and IIId). The pelagic fleet is economically important and contributes 146	
approximately 45% of the total annual landing value in Denmark.  147	
There have been considerable structural changes in the Danish pelagic fleet since the 148	
introduction of an individually tradeable quota (ITQ) system in January 2003, with a decrease 149	
in vessel numbers from 130 vessels fishing herring in 2000 to approximately 25 vessels in 150	
2012. This fleet restructuring has resulted in a better balance between fleet capacity and 151	
fishing opportunities, and improved economic performance through increases in catch 152	
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efficiency. Catch technology (e.g. gear size and electronic fish-finding and navigational 153	
equipment) has been shown to improve in newer, larger vessels (Eigaard 2009; Eigaard et al. 154	
2014), adding to the observed increasing trend in fishing power.  155	
 156	
The Greek demersal fishery  157	
The third fishery, the Greek demersal fishery, has an essentially multispecies nature with up 158	
to 100 species in some areas, that is typical of Mediterranean fisheries (Caddy 2009). There is 159	
a high interaction between gears and fleet segments, since most of the main target species are 160	
exploited by more than one fishing technique or strategy, each often concentrating on 161	
individuals of different sizes. The fishery is generally managed through input regulations i.e. 162	
effort control rules and technical measures, such as closed seasons, closed areas, limited 163	
licenses, minimum landing size (MLS), mesh size regulations, and maximum gear sizes. The 164	
selected study area was the northern part of the FAO General Fisheries Council for the 165	
Mediterranean (GFCM) GSA 22.  166	
The Data Collection Regulation (DCR) programme (EC 1543/2000; EC 949/2008) has enabled a 167	
time series of effort and landings data in the Mediterranean to be built (Vassilakopoulos et al. 168	
2014) and improved the data limitations which constrained past stock assessments. Under the 169	
DCR framework data on effort and landings have been collected in Greece since 2002 from 170	
209 landing ports on a monthly basis. The active Greek trawler fleet in the Aegean Sea 171	
consists of 299 vessels that use bottom trawl nets as the main gear. The gear used is more or 172	
less the same (40 mm diamond mesh size) irrespective of the target species, with only minor 173	
modifications. 174	
 175	
Methodology 176	
Choice Experiment surveys involve the respondent making a series of choices between 177	
scenarios comprised of component attributes with varying levels.  In this study the choice 178	
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scenarios consist of varying combinations of fisheries management options.  The survey 179	
attributes were selected based on their prominence in the CFP reform process, on relevance 180	
for fishing industry stakeholders and on the need to integrate ecological, economic and social 181	
factors. From a comprehensive list of potential choices six attributes with varying levels were 182	
selected:  long-term biological outlook of the fishery; management scale; importance of 183	
fishing to the local community; management measures; access and quota allocation options 184	
and a cost attribute. Although not of direct relevance in the analysis presented in this paper, 185	
the inclusion of a cost attribute is a requirement to allow for an assessment of welfare impacts 186	
arising from moving from one suite of management policies to another. The cost attribute 187	
selected was the annual payment made by fishers to their representative organisations. We 188	
felt that this financial contribution is more closely related to management performance than 189	
for instance the market price of fish that may fluctuate independently of how well a fishery is 190	
managed.  191	
An important criterion in the selection of attributes was that they had to be sufficiently 192	
generic to be relevant in three case study fisheries, in different countries, and with diverse 193	
management arrangements.  The only case specific modification required was in changing the 194	
Transferable Fishing Concession (TFC) attribute levels to Transferable Territorial Use Rights 195	
in Fisheries (TURFs) for the Greek demersal fisheries as quotas are not used in the 196	
Mediterranean.   197	
A related issue is that both the choice of attributes and the range of attribute levels used in the 198	
survey should as far as possible be meaningful to respondents rather than being purely 199	
hypothetical. This is an important consideration in order to avoid speculative or protest 200	
responses. Table 1 shows the attributes and their levels.  201	
In a choice experiment, an experimental design is used to map attributes and levels into sets 202	
of alternatives to which respondents indicate their choices.  For the main survey a D-efficient 203	
design was used. A D-efficient design identifies a subset of choice situations from all possible 204	
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combinations of attribute-levels (full factorial design) and places the subset into groups of 205	
alternatives. An experimental design with 24 choice questions was used but the final design 206	
was partitioned into two blocks so that each fisher was presented with a total of 12 choice 207	
cards. Blocking reduces the necessary cognitive effort for each respondent and the use of 208	
efficient design principles means that it is possible to break multiple attributes and levels 209	
down into a smaller number of cards designed in such a way as to generate results as 210	
efficiently as a full factorial design (Hynes et al. 2013). 211	
A pilot survey with 7 fishers from the Celtic Sea herring case study was conducted to obtain 212	
informed priors for the design that was then produced in Ngene (Econometric software; 213	
version 1.1.0). Fishers were offered 12 choice cards each and were asked to choose one of 214	
three different options per card. An example choice card is provided in Figure 2. Some initial 215	
issues with the survey design were addressed following the pilot survey. Changes were made 216	
to Option C in the main survey as the pilot survey yielded a relatively high number of status 217	
quo bids possibly due to the fact that the stock status was improving in this fishery and 218	
therefore changes to the current management approach may have been viewed negatively.  219	
Analysis of the responses following the changes to Option C show that the three options 220	
attracted almost evenly distributed numbers of bids and therefore there is no evidence of 221	
significant status quo bias in the survey overall. Indeed, there was only one respondent in the 222	
survey who chose Option C on all cards. Additionally, the use of a cheap talk script in order 223	
to reduce hypothetical bias was employed for the main survey. A cheap talk script attempts 224	
to reduce bias stemming from the hypothetical nature of the experiments that may increase 225	
the propensity of respondents to exaggerate stated opinions. The cheap talk script contained 226	
the following text: “We would like to know your opinion in order to assist in the design and 227	
selection of management measures that are consistent with sustainability and provide 228	
consensus across different stakeholder groups.  There are no right or wrong answers – we are 229	
only interested in finding out your true opinion of management measures.” 230	
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In addition to the Choice Experiment some economic and demographic data were collected 231	
and follow-up questions asked.  The additional data was used during the analysis of results 232	
to examine whether economic or demographic factors were explanatory variables underlying 233	
survey responses. Follow-up questions covered issues such as whether respondents had 234	
ignored any attributes in making their choices and ranking exercises on general fisheries 235	
management preferences.  These questions were designed and used to compare responses 236	
using different survey methods. 237	
 238	
Discrete Choice models 239	
The Random Utility Model (RUM) developed by McFadden (1973) was employed to examine 240	
fisher’s choices amongst alternative management choices. RUM operates on the assumption 241	
that utility is composed of an observable component and a random component, which gives a 242	
utility function of this form: 243	
.          (1) 244	
where  is the nth fisher’s utility associated with choosing alternative i, Vni, is the non-245	
stochastic portion determined by the characteristics of the alternative management options 246	
and is the stochastic element. It is assumed that the observed choice is the one associated 247	
with the highest obtained utility ( ). The probability that respondent n chooses alternative 248	
i from the set of J alternatives is given by: 249	 !"# = !%&'()"# + +"# ≥ )"- + +"-; /&%	122	3 ∈ 5"                                                                               (2) 250	
where 56 is the choice-set of fisher n comprising of the alternative management options A, B 251	
and status quo option C. 252	
The observed utility  is assumed to be linear in the parameters so that  where 253	
 is a vector of observed variables relating to alternative i and 7	is the associated vector of 254	
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coefficients. If  is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with the Type 1 255	
extreme value distribution, this probability will have a closed form expression, leading to the 256	
Conditional Logit (CL) model:  257	
.         (3) 258	
The CL model has some important limitations in analysing choice data, (outlined in detail in 259	
Train, 2003) and the Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model can be used to overcome these 260	
problems. The RPL relaxes the assumption that observations are independent, and allows the 261	
β parameters to vary across individuals and thus accommodates heterogeneous preferences 262	
in the sampled population by generating a distribution of β parameters which vary randomly 263	
over all individuals (Hynes et al. 2008). The RPL model also allows the error components of 264	
different alternatives to be correlated. The RPL model outputs are presented in the Results 265	
section. Additionally all of the statistical metrics used to aid the researcher in selecting the 266	
most appropriate model (Log likelihood, AIC, Bayes IC and Hannan Quinn) indicate that the 267	
RPL provided an improvement in fit over the CL model (Table 2). A McFadden's pseudo R2 268	
value between 0.2 to 0.4 is considered to indicate a model of good fit (McFadden 1979) and 269	
the value in our model of 0.34 indicates that the attributes in the model do a good job in 270	
explaining the variability in choices made. 271	
The RPL model is a flexible logit model that allows parameters associated with the observed 272	
variable to vary across individuals where there is a known population distribution. The 273	
probability of fisher n choosing alternative i on choice occasion t is given by the following 274	
logit formula: 275	
!"-8 = 9(:;<;=>)∑ 9(:;<;A>)BACD           (4) 276	
where 76 is a random parameter with unconditional density /(76|E) and E is the distribution 277	
of 76. The RPL model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood estimation 278	
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procedures. For an in-depth discussion of the family of RUM modelling approaches the 279	
interested reader is directed to Train (2003) and for the RPL model in particular to Revelt and 280	
Train (1998). In this study we use a simulated maximum likelihood estimator with 200 Halton 281	
draws in the final estimation of the model.  282	
The RPL model demonstrates whether heterogeneity exists around the mean population 283	
parameters through the estimation of a standard deviation parameter associated with each 284	
random parameter estimate. The RPL model also examines possible explanatory factors of the 285	
heterogeneity that exists amongst fishers by interacting the random parameters with 286	
variables that the researcher suspects may be a possible driver of variation in values. In this 287	
case we accomplish this by interacting the vessel size and nationality variables with our 288	
attribute levels in a pooled RPL model. 289	
 290	
Survey implementation 291	
The survey was conducted in the three case study countries; Ireland, Denmark and Greece, 292	
with as high a sampling ratio of the population as possible.  In the Celtic Sea herring fishery 293	
the number of fishers surveyed was 36 (with 43 surveys in total conducted including the 294	
pilot) representing approximately 75% of the total number of participants in the fishery.  In 295	
Denmark 18 surveys with owners and/or skippers of 14 vessels were conducted, representing 296	
approximately 61% of the total number of vessels in the Danish herring fishery. In Greece 13 297	
surveys were conducted representing approximately 45% of the total number of participants 298	
in this fishery.  The total number of surveys conducted across the 3 locations was 74. 299	
Although the overall sample size (N = 74) is small in comparison with some other choice 300	
experiments it does represent over 50% of the total population available and is comparable 301	
with other published literature. De Bekker-Grob et al. (2015) reported that 32% of choice 302	
experiments in the healthcare area had sample sizes less than 100. Wielgus et al. (2009) used a 303	
sample of 87 when estimating anglers willingness to pay for angling locations. Adams et al. 304	
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(2014) had 92 respondents in a choice experiment survey analysing landholder’s spatial 305	
conservation priorities. Rose and Bliemer (2013) also demonstrate that D-efficient choice 306	
experimental designs require much smaller sample sizes than random orthogonal designs.  307	
Selection of respondents was made through consultation with the relevant fisher’s 308	
organisations in each country. In all cases the survey was conducted as a face-to-face survey.  309	
Each respondent was given background information on the survey purpose and an 310	
explanation of how it would be conducted.  They were given a practice choice card to 311	
familiarise them with how the choice experiment survey worked.  The choice options on the 312	
practice card were not the same as those on the real cards to avoid any anchoring effects. 313	
Anchoring occurs when the initial choices and their associated attribute levels provide a focal 314	
point or anchor for respondents that are uncertain about their true preferences. Anchoring is 315	
usually related in particular to the initial bid values provided in the sample choice card. 316	
Using attributes that are familiar to the respondents, as was done in this study, also reduces 317	
these anchoring effects. The respondents were then asked to complete the 12 choice cards.  318	
 319	
Results 320	
Table 2 gives the results from the RPL model described in the previous section. The 321	
coefficients in the models are interpreted as showing the average impact of the respective 322	
choice attributes on fisher n’s utility. Given that the choice probability Pni depends only on the 323	
difference in utility and not its absolute level, the analyst concentrates generally on the sign of 324	
the coefficient where a positive sign indicates that on average the presence of the associated 325	
attribute level in a management option contributes positively to a fisher’s utility and a 326	
negative sign indicates it contributes negatively to the fisher’s utility. The preferences for the 327	
discrete attribute levels, represented in the coefficient signs, are interpreted relative to their 328	
base case. The base case for each attribute is given in Table 2. 329	
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One of the most interesting results evident from the individual fisheries models presented in 330	
Table 2 is that there are no management attribute levels that elicit the same preference 331	
structure across all three fisheries. The Irish and Danish fishers both prefer management 332	
options that are more likely to result in a good biological outlook for the stock.  The responses 333	
of Greek fishers revealed that biological outlook was less important in comparison to other 334	
variables. However, it should be mentioned that the size and significance (albeit at the 10% 335	
level) of standard deviation for biological outlook indicates a wide diversity of preferences, 336	
both positive and negative suggesting that this attribute provokes a mixed response (Rigby 337	
and Burton 2003). 338	
Preference structures for levels of the management scale attribute were quite different across 339	
the three fisheries. Irish fishers had a strong preference for co-management over regional, EU 340	
or national management frameworks. Co-management was the base case level for the 341	
management scale attribute. The negative sign for the regional, EU or national management 342	
frameworks indicate that they are less preferred relative to co-management. Greek fishers 343	
had no significant preferences for any of the management scale attribute levels. Danish 344	
pelagic fishers appear to prefer regional or national management frameworks to co-345	
management or EU based management. There may however have been some 346	
misunderstanding of the meaning of co-management in the Danish case and these are 347	
addressed in more detail in the Discussion section. 348	
Measures that maintain or strengthen the importance of fishing within the local community 349	
were prioritised to some extent in all three fisheries. This preference was most evident in the 350	
Irish case where measures that maintain or increase the importance of fishing in the 351	
community were significantly preferred. For the Greek fishers measures maintaining the 352	
community importance of fishing at its current level are significantly preferred. Based on the 353	
significance of the standard deviation associated with measures increasing the social 354	
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importance of fishing it is evident that only in the Danish case is there any indication that this 355	
attribute provoked a mixed response. 356	
In relation to the management measures attribute both the Celtic Sea herring and particularly 357	
the Greek demersal fishers had significant negative preferences with regards to a landing 358	
obligation while the Danish pelagic fishery supported it.  Danish fishers also supported the 359	
use of temporary spatial closures more than Irish fishers while Greek fishers had mixed 360	
preferences. Greek fishers had significant negative preferences for permanent area closures 361	
while both Irish and Danish fishers had mixed responses. 362	
Greek fishers had no significant preferences for any of the levels associated with the access 363	
and quota management attribute while Irish and Danish fishers have almost diametrically 364	
opposed preference structures.  Celtic Sea herring fishers are negatively inclined towards 365	
tradable fishing concessions while Danish fishers prefer them over other access and quota 366	
management options. 367	
In relation to the financial attribute only the Irish case shows the expected preference for 368	
management scenarios that minimise costs.  The implications of this are explored in more 369	
detail in the Discussion section.  370	
Table 3 displays the results of a pooled RPL model where all 3 samples are combined. The 371	
pooled model facilitates the inclusion of fishery and vessel size interactions with the Irish 372	
fishery as the base case. These model results reinforce the findings from the separate RPL 373	
models in Table 2 of significant preference heterogeneity across fisheries. While the 374	
individual fisheries models explain variation in a deterministic way for each fleet, by a 375	
segmentation of the fishers into mutually exclusive subsets the pooled model allows for an 376	
additional, purely random, variation in tastes across all fleets.  377	
Looking at the interaction terms, Danish fishers have significantly different preferences for all 378	
except two of the attributes in the pooled model when compared to the base case of Irish 379	
fishers. The effect is particularly evident in relation to the landing obligation attribute and the 380	
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internationally tradable TFCs attributes, reflecting the findings in the Danish model 381	
presented in Table 2.  382	
The pooled model also reveals that Greek fishers have a preference for regional and national 383	
management and derive less utility from measures increasing the community importance of 384	
fishing, again compared to the base case of Irish fishers. 385	
The interaction variable for vessel size also shows that owners of larger vessels have 386	
significantly less preference for management scenarios that increase the importance of fishing 387	
to the local community and significantly prefer both nationally and internationally tradable 388	
individual fishing concessions.  389	
In addition to the choice cards fishers were also asked a number of other attitudinal questions 390	
in the survey that can help explain the preferences shown in the models above. In particular, 391	
responses to the supplementary question on high level fisheries management objectives 392	
(Figure 3) showed no consistent pattern across the three case studies with each case 393	
prioritising a different objective. “Importance of fishing in the local community” was the 394	
most highly prioritised management objective among Celtic Sea herring fishers, a finding 395	
which is consistent with the RPL model outputs, while “Ecosystem Productivity” and 396	
“Profits and Return on Investment” were the highest for Greek and Danish fishers 397	
respectively. 398	
The other supplementary question asked respondents to rank 10 CFP related management 399	
measures in order of their potential to improve fisheries management (Figure 4). The most 400	
preferred option for both Celtic Sea and Danish respondents was to “Increase industry input, 401	
role and responsibilities”. The highest ranking management issue for Greek respondents was 402	
to “Improve the regional decision making structure of the CFP”.  As was evident in the 403	
individual fishery RPL models, one of the more divisive management options was to “Make 404	
quotas individual and transferable” which was the second highest ranked objective for 405	
Danish respondents while being the second lowest ranked for Celtic Sea fishers. The Greek 406	
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survey omitted this option from the question as quotas are not used in Mediterranean 407	
fisheries. A landing obligation ranked as the measure least likely to improve fisheries 408	
management across all three case studies. 409	
 410	
Discussion 411	
One of the most interesting findings from this research is that there are no management 412	
attributes that provoke a unanimous response across the three case studies.  This dissensus is 413	
evident in both the estimated discrete choice models and the ranking exercises of fisheries 414	
objectives and management measures. The lack of unanimity highlights the fact that there are 415	
no panaceas in fisheries management and that generic solutions, untailored to the social, 416	
economic or cultural context of specific fisheries, create a significant risk of non-compliance 417	
and associated unsustainability. For this reason the discussion will focus on the preference 418	
structures within each case study fishery followed by overarching conclusions that may be 419	
drawn more generally about European and global fisheries management. 420	
Celtic Sea herring fishers were found to have strong preferences for a management system 421	
that prioritises stock health, is based on co-management, promotes the community 422	
importance of fishing, with non-tradable quotas and that minimises costs.  This could be seen 423	
as a support for the management system currently in place but there are a few more complex 424	
issues evident from a closer examination of the results.  The strong support for precautionary 425	
management that prioritises stock health may be due in part to two previous stock collapses 426	
in the fishery (Fitzpatrick 2014). The long established local co-management system governing 427	
the fishery receives a strong endorsement as all other management frameworks are strongly 428	
rejected. Both the strong emphasis on the community importance of fishing and the rejection 429	
of ITQ systems reflect official Irish positions in CFP reform negotiations (DAFF 2010). 430	
Although a restricted access system based on track record has replaced a de facto open access 431	
system in the fishery (DAFF 2012) and appears to be supported it should be noted that the 432	
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high standard deviation coefficients in relation to a limited access regime and nationally 433	
tradeable quotas indicate a diversity of preferences for these options.  These results mirror 434	
conflicting attitudes evident at meetings of the local co-management body, attended by one of 435	
the authors, between those who support traditional access rights versus those who support 436	
more restricted access. A landing obligation was not supported by a majority of respondents 437	
but preferences for the measure were diverse. This may be due to the fact that the 438	
participants in the fishery are made up of a combination of exclusively pelagic fishers and 439	
polyvalent skippers switching between pelagic and demersal fisheries. A landing obligation 440	
may be expected to present different challenges for these sectors as evident in the different 441	
timelines for implementation of the CFP landing obligation in the pelagic and demersal 442	
sectors. Preference differences on the issues of quota individualisation and discards may be 443	
driven by these sectoral differences as exclusively pelagic fishers, whose vessels tend to be 444	
larger and more highly capitalised, will not face the same level of discard related issues such 445	
as choke species nor are they still involved in fisheries with open access arrangements.  446	
Greek demersal fisher’s preferences with regards to good biological outlook were mixed.   447	
Information collected during follow-up interviews to discuss the CE results explored in more 448	
detail why some respondents consider the maintenance of stock health a low priority while 449	
others are in favour of rebuilding stock status as they consider the resources overexploited. 450	
Those fishers assigning a low priority to the resource level are not necessarily discounting the 451	
importance of stock status but rather they consider other issues of greater immediate 452	
importance e.g. the CFP landing obligation, overcapacity, low fish prices, high costs and 453	
taxes. The fishers who support the idea that future stock health should be a top priority feel 454	
that action towards this could be implemented through a more regionalised governance 455	
approach.  This is evident from the supplementary question on ranking management 456	
measures (Figure 4) and from the pooled RPL model (Table 3).  457	
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One of the main issues in Greek fisheries management is the conflict between the coastal and 458	
trawl fishers (Maravelias et al. 2014). Coastal fishers consider the trawlers responsible for the 459	
deteriorating state of the stocks while the trawlers consider that they are over-regulated and 460	
controlled while at the same time coastal fisheries are favourably treated by the system. Trawl 461	
fishers envisage that managing the fishery at a regional level will better alleviate this inequity 462	
than co-management would.   463	
Danish pelagic respondents have strong preferences for a management system that prioritises 464	
stock health, is based on national or regional management, a landing obligation, temporary 465	
closures and allows the trading of quotas at national and international level. 466	
In relation to the management framework, feedback from the researcher conducting the 467	
Danish surveys indicate that there may have been a misunderstanding of the term co-468	
management while results from the supplementary questions indicate that a regionalised co-469	
management structure may be their preferred management framework.  The Danish pelagic 470	
herring fishery takes place with large vessels across most of the North Atlantic with stocks 471	
that are managed through international bodies and negotiations. Such a broad management 472	
scale probably promotes a more regional rather than local mind-set that may have caused 473	
some unintended confusion with regards to the meaning of co-management, and this may be 474	
the reason for the somewhat surprising Danish preference for regional management. This 475	
confusion has been verified by follow-up phone calls conducted with the original 476	
respondents subsequent to the survey. The strong diversity in preference structures across 477	
Danish respondents, evidenced by significant standard deviation coefficients for most 478	
attributes, may be due to the fact that the sample was split between very large modern 479	
vessels with associated high investment levels and smaller vessels with investment levels at 480	
least an order of magnitude smaller. The most significant preference differences are evident 481	
in management scale, community importance of fishing, use of permanent closures and 482	
international trading of quotas. 483	
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 484	
Implications for fisheries governance 485	
The main implication of this research can be found in the heterogeneity of the preferences in 486	
the three different fisheries examined. It is notable that the three fisheries clearly showed 487	
different priorities in the ranking of high level management objectives, with the Irish 488	
favouring support for the local community, the Danish emphasising profits, and the Greeks 489	
emphasising ecosystem productivity. This does not necessarily reflect national differences but 490	
may be due to the different nature of each of the fisheries examined, ranging from 491	
industrialised pelagic fishing in Denmark to quite small scale demersal fisheries in Greece, 492	
with Ireland somewhere in between. There are also some important similarities, most 493	
significantly in terms of community wellbeing and implementation of the CFP landing 494	
obligation.   495	
Support for measures that maintain or strengthen the importance of fishing to the local 496	
community was evident to some extent in all three fisheries both in the Choice Experiment 497	
and in ranking exercises. This community aspect is important as it highlights an area of 498	
fisheries management which is seldom highly prioritised (Haapasaari et al. 2013; Symes and 499	
Phillipson 2009). Clear biological, economic and ecosystem objectives do exist e.g. MSY (Ye et 500	
al. 2013), Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) (Norman-Lopez and Pascoe 2011) and the EU 501	
Marine Strategy Framework Directive descriptors (Commission of the European 502	
Communities 2008) but no such clear objectives have been formalised in the social arena 503	
(Urquhart et al. 2011). Finding clear community-based objectives in the EU CFP, for example, 504	
is difficult. This contradiction between fishers perceptions of the importance of social issues 505	
and community wellbeing and the lack of associated management objectives points to a 506	
policy failure within the EU and opens the door to an opaque lobbying process rather than a 507	
transparent social assessment of management performance. 508	
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Social issues and associated objectives obviously matter then but have been notoriously 509	
difficult to clearly identify (Symes and Phillipson 2009) although mechanisms to do so exist 510	
(Dutra et al. 2015; Fletcher 2015). We need indicators associated with social objectives against 511	
which we can evaluate any fisheries management measures that are undertaken. A possible 512	
starting point was provided by Dichmont et al. (2012) in Australia. Under a heading of 513	
"Maximise social outcomes", they identified a number of objectives; maximise employment, 514	
ensure equity, and maximise other social benefits from the use of the resource to the local 515	
community. They were also able to propose indicators for each objective. The approach was 516	
further developed by Pascoe et al. (2014) with an acknowledgement that such objectives were 517	
highly context specific. That context is obviously spatial, as in different areas, as well as in 518	
different fisheries, but it may also display variability in time. Rindorf et al. (2016) noted that 519	
social objectives can vary quickly, e.g. as economies expand or decline, while biological 520	
objectives may be more stable. 521	
Assuming that we can provide agreed social objectives, we can then combine these with 522	
already existing biological, economic and ecosystem objectives.  Trenkel et al. (2015) indicated 523	
that “If the target reference points are positioned correctly relative to the limits and are the product of 524	
governance processes that did capture social and economic goals effectively, then managing to keep 525	
mature biomass and fishing mortality near their respective targets will achieve ecological, social and 526	
economic sustainability, if such full sustainability is possible to achieve”. If this is accepted, then 527	
there is a clear need, in EU and non-EU fisheries alike, to get to the point where we do have 528	
those important social goals captured, perhaps by following the Australian example 529	
described above. 530	
The very different responses between the case studies on tradable rights may also reflect 531	
community issues. It is commonly assumed that tradable rights will lead to concentration of 532	
fishing opportunities with associated social changes (van Hoof 2015). Such measures were 533	
strongly opposed in the Irish case study where social issues ranked highest, but were 534	
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positively viewed by the Danish fishers. The Greek respondents were in favour of nationally 535	
tradable rights, but not internationally tradable ones, presumably reflecting a social objective 536	
of retaining ownership within the state. The tendency for smaller vessel operators to prefer 537	
community objectives and to oppose tradable rights can also be seen in a social context. 538	
Small-scale fishers will be close to their own communities, and will likely oppose the 539	
perceived concentration of fishing rights in a few hands when those rights are tradable. 540	
Conversely bigger vessels will tend to have a weaker link to any one community, may tend to 541	
be more driven by profit and will be more confident of maintaining access to those rights 542	
under a tradeable system due to their superior economic capacity (Thøgersen et al. 2015).     543	
Perhaps the nearest thing to a unanimous response to a management measure was towards a 544	
landing obligation. All three fisheries ranked it as the measure least likely to improve the 545	
management of their fishery in the supplementary question and two of the three fisheries had 546	
a significant negative preference for it in the choice experiment. This negative response may 547	
not come as a surprise as EU fishers have broadly denigrated the landing obligation (see for 548	
example EAPO and EUROPECHE 2016). However the advantage of the choice experiment 549	
method over simple ranking questions is evident in the fact that the Danish respondents 550	
ranked a discard ban as their lowest choice in a simple ranking exercise but when they were 551	
in effect forced to trade-off in the choice experiment they were prepared to accept a discard 552	
ban in preference to other measures such as area closures or effort control. This finding 553	
indicates that at least for pelagic fishers implementation of the landings obligation is 554	
perceived to be workable but that significant challenges exist in demersal fisheries.  555	
We found significant variation both within and across fisheries. This highlights the need to 556	
include a broad range of fishers in decision-making processes on management measures, 557	
particularly where there may be significant social and economic impacts. It might also 558	
suggest that there could be a different approach for larger and smaller vessels. For instance, 559	
the most significant difference in the preferences of large vessel owners was for transferable 560	
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quota arrangements. This difference indicates that transferable quotas might be appropriate 561	
for more industrial fleets and less so for the more artisanal ones. This finding may not be 562	
surprising but it has significant policy implications. Many fishing fleets are still dominated in 563	
numbers by small vessels, while high level representation and political influence arguably 564	
give the owners of larger vessels a greater voice in debates (McGoodwin, 2001, Béné et al. 565	
2007). Further research is warranted into how such power asymmetries in fishers 566	
representation may influence policy-making and whether this might tend to shift fisheries 567	
management decisions towards business based decisions by the larger operators and away 568	
from community-based decisions.  569	
Although this research was conducted with European fishers there are a number of reasons 570	
why we consider the findings to be relevant for fisheries globally. Firstly, the principal issue 571	
that we were exploring, how fishers value a range of management measures and trade off 572	
between them, is relevant to fishers and managers anywhere. Many of the trade-offs and 573	
conflicts discussed in this paper are topical issues beyond the EU (e.g. the conflict between 574	
individualised quotas or catch shares and perceived coastal community wellbeing in the US 575	
(Clay et al. 2014)).  Secondly, a diversity of fleet sectors were included in our survey, all of 576	
which have similar counterparts in fisheries in other regions. Thirdly, the Choice Experiment 577	
method has been useful in testing a previously underutilised tool for analysing the key issue 578	
of how fishers trade-off between management measures and provides a more complex 579	
understanding of fishers preferences than simple ranking or prioritisation methods. 580	
In conclusion, the main finding of this study is that in fisheries management, one size does 581	
not fit all, and that it is vital to consider the context in each case. Major differences in 582	
preferences with regards to management, ecosystem, economic and social sustainability 583	
issues were identified between the three fisheries. Even on issues where there appears to be 584	
widespread agreement, such as support for local communities, closer analysis reveals 585	
differences between and within fisheries particularly based on vessel size. The need for clear, 586	
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agreed and contextual social objectives was clearly identified. This is a very strong argument 587	
for more regional and even intra-sectoral approaches based on overarching principles, but 588	
with local, contextual nuance, rather than prescriptive single measures.   589	
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Table 1:  Attributes and attribute levels used in Choice Experiment 770	
Attributes Levels 
Long-term biological 
sustainability of the fishery 
Medium to Poor Good 
Management Scale 
Central European 
Management 
Regional Advisory 
Council Management 
National Management 
 
Co-Management 
 
Fishing Community 
viability 
Importance of fishing industry to 
local community maintained at 
current level 
Decline in importance of fishing 
industry to local community 
(-20%) 
Increase in importance of 
fishing industry to local 
community (+20%) 
Management measures Permanent area closures 
Temporary area 
closures 
Discard ban Effort control (days at sea) 
Access & quota allocation 
regime 
Open to all current 
licensees and eligible 
new entrants 
Limited access regime 
based on track record 
in fishery 
Nationally Tradable 
TFCs/TURFs 
Internationally Tradable 
TFCs/TURFs 
Increase in subscription to 
management organisation 
0 +10% +20% +35% +50% +75% +100% 
  771	
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Table 2: Results of Random Parameters Logit Model for the three case study fisheries 772	  
Celtic Sea Herring Greek Demersal Danish Pelagic  
Mean of Coefficient SD of Coefficient  Mean of Coefficient     SD of Coefficient Mean of Coefficient SD of Coefficient 
Good biological outlook 2.27 (0.38) *** 1.09 (0.28) *** -0.54 (0.51)  0.84 (0.44) * 1.44 (0.62) ** 1.32 (0.74) * 
(Base case is Medium to Poor biological outlook)                   
National Management -0.58 (0.32) * 0.38 (0.27)  0.73 (0.53)  0.27 (0.48)  2.28 (0.67) *** 1.39 (0.42) *** 
Regional Management -1.45 (0.42) *** 0.73 (0.45)  0.69 (0.56)  0.68 (0.84)  2.08 (0.76) *** 3.27 (1.21) *** 
Central EU Management -1.08 (0.37) *** 0.06 (0.50)  -0.37 (0.67)  0.46 (0.63)  -1.58 (0.96) * 4.75 (1.17) *** 
(Base case is Co-Management)                   
Community importance of 
fishing maintained at 
current level 
0.83 (0.30) *** 0.34 (0.37)  1.10 (0.59) * 1.15 (0.56) ** 1.21 (0.77)  0.99 (0.76)  
20% increase in importance 
of fishing to community 
1.99 (0.33) *** 0.23 (0.44)  0.10 (0.43)  0.10 (0.53)  1.02 (0.75)  1.84 (0.59) *** 
(Base case is 20% decline in importance of fishing to the local community)                   
Discard Ban -0.81 (0.43) * 1.24 (0.41) *** -2.23 (0.75) *** 0.41 (0.64)  4.20 (1.02) *** 0.74 (0.55)  
Temporary Area Closures -0.11 (0.37)  0.28 (0.61)  -0.10 (0.64)  1.23 (0.67) * 3.73 (1.06) *** 2.17 (0.96) ** 
Permanent Area Closures 0.04 (0.34)  0.69 (0.29) ** -2.05 (0.69) *** 0.69 (0.55)  0.61 (0.81)  3.05 (0.67) *** 
(Base case is Effort Control)                   
Limited Access based on 
track record 1.31 (0.49) *** 3.21 (0.62) *** -0.31 (0.51) 
 0.47 (0.56)  1.10 (0.72)  1.04 (0.74)  
Nationally tradable 
TFC's/TURF's -1.59 (0.45) *** 2.17 (0.40) *** 0.78 (0.50) 
 0.88 (0.66)  4.05 (0.80) *** 1.53 (0.68) ** 
Internationally tradable 
TFC's/TURF's -4.57 (1.22) *** 3.53 (1.29) *** -0.71 (0.48) 
 0.47 (0.40)  5.40 (1.28) *** 5.71 (1.35) *** 
(Base case is Open to all current licensees and eligible new entrants)                   
Cost -0.002 (0.00) *** 0.001 (0.00) ** 0.001 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  
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    Log likelihood function            -370.53735    Log likelihood function            -144.62886    Log likelihood function             -127.16200 
    Chi squared [  26 d.f.]                 392.69318    Chi squared [  26 d.f.]                   53.50931    Chi squared [  26 d.f.]                  215.88207 
    McFadden Pseudo R-squared         .34636    McFadden Pseudo R-squared         .15610    McFadden Pseudo R-squared          .45912 
    AIC                                                    1.53697    AIC                                                    2.18755       AIC                                                     1.43142    
 773	
Figures in parentheses indicate the values of the standard errors.  *** = significant at 1%  ** = significant at 5% * = significant at 10%.   774	
Positive coefficient values indicate that attribute level is preferred to base case while negative values indicate that base case is preferred to the attribute level. “Medium to 775	
Poor” is the base case level in terms of the Long-Term Biological outlook attribute. “Co-management” is the base case level in terms of the Management Scale attribute. 776	
“Decline in importance of fishing industry to local community” is the base case level for the Fishing Community Viability attribute.  “Effort control” is the base case for the 777	
Management Measures attribute.  “Open to all current licensees and eligible new entrants” is the base case for the Access & Quota Allocation Regime attribute.778	
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Table 3: Results of pooled Random Parameters Logit model with fisheries and vessel size as interaction factors 779	
 Pooled data Greek Danish Vessel Size 
 Mean of Coefficient SD of Coefficient Heterogeneity  
in Mean 
Heterogeneity in 
Mean 
Heterogeneity  
in Mean 
Good biological outlook 1.84 (0.41) *** 0.51 (0.39)  -2.31 (0.46) *** -1.52 (0.52) *** 0.01 (0.01)  
(Base case is Medium to Poor biological outlook)                
National Management -0.19 (0.48)  0.24 (0.34)  1.37 (0.63) ** 1.72 (0.64) *** -0.02 (0.02)  
Regional Management -1.10 (0.60) * 0.59 (0.47)  1.99 (0.66) *** 2.34 (0.78) *** -0.01 (0.02)  
Central European Management -0.25 (0.57)  0.67 (0.34) ** 1.02 (0.80)  2.54 (0.78) *** -0.04 (0.02) * 
(Base case is Co-Management)                
Community importance of fishing 
maintained at current level    1.50 (0.49) *** 0.17 (0.33) 
 -0.02 (0.49)  0.55 (0.66) * -0.03 (0.02)  
20% increase in importance of 
fishing to local community 2.86 (0.53) *** 0.37 (0.29) 
 -1.45 (0.54) *** 0.74 (0.72)  -0.05 (0.02) ** 
(Base case is 20% decline in importance of fishing to the local community)                
Discard Ban -1.42 (0.74) * 1.20 (0.41) *** -1.86 (0.78) ** 3.97 (0.91) *** 0.03 (0.03)  
Temporary Area Closures 0.48 (0.68)  1.16 (0.31) *** -0.31 (0.74)  2.85 (0.88) *** -0.03 (0.02)  
Permanent Area Closures 0.38 (0.65)  1.11 (0.28) *** -1.58 (0.75) ** 1.32 (0.93)  -0.04 (0.03)  
(Base case is Effort Control)                
Ltd. Access based on track record -0.49 (0.67)  2.26 (0.42) *** -0.64 (0.82)  -0.83 (1.01)  0.04 (0.02) * 
Nationally tradable TFC's/TURF's  -3.24 (0.63) *** 1.70 (0.36) *** 1.06 (0.75)  1.60 (0.81) ** 0.11 (0.02) *** 
Internationally tradable 
TFC's/TURF's  -6.35 (1.06) *** 1.85 (0.48) *** 2.27 (0.96) ** 4.10 (1.03) *** 0.12 (0.03) *** 
(Base case is Open to all current licensees and eligible new entrants)                
Cost -0.002 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)  0.002 (0.00) *** 0.001 (0.00) *** 0.00 (0.00)  
 
      
      Log likelihood function              -639.75558          
       Chi squared [  65 d.f.]                   667.22982          
       McFadden Pseudo R-squared           .34274          
       AIC                                                      1.59087           
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 780	
Figures in parentheses indicate the values of the standard errors.  *** = significant at 1%  ** = significant at 5% * = significant at 10%.   781	
Positive coefficient values indicate that attribute level is preferred to base case while negative values indicate that base case is preferred to the attribute level. “Medium to 782	
Poor” is the base case level in terms of the Long-Term Biological outlook attribute. “Co-management” is the base case level in terms of the Management Scale attribute. 783	
“Decline in importance of fishing industry to local community” is the base case level for the Fishing Community Viability attribute.  “Effort control” is the base case for the 784	
Management Measures attribute.  “Open to all current licensees and eligible new entrants” is the base case for the Access & Quota Allocation Regime attribute.  785	
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Figure 1: Map of grounds fished by surveyed fleets.	786	
 787	
Figure 2: Example Choice Card given to survey respondents. 788	
 789	
Figure 3: Ranking of high level fisheries management objectives across case studies 790	
(Respondents were asked to rank the four fisheries management objectives in terms of their importance for them. Error bars represent standard deviation). 791	
 792	
Figure 4: Average scores for management measures proposed during CFP reform across case studies. (Respondents were asked to rank, from 1 to 10, the 793	
measures in order of their potential to improve fisheries management. Error bars represent standard deviation). 794	
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